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 Abstract 
From 1953 to 1960, the federal government terminated sovereign recognition for 109 American 
Indian nations. Termination was a haphazard policy of assimilation that had disastrous 
consequences for Indian land and culture. Nonetheless, termination cloaked latent motivations 
for Indian land within individual rights rhetoric that was at odds with Indian sovereignty. 
Termination highlights the rhetorical features of social control under capitalism portrayed in 
George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949), in which opposing principles are fused and 
inverted. This essay critiques termination’s Orwellian language to show how ideographs of 
social liberation are refashioned by the state to subvert Indian sovereignty and popular dissent.  
 
 Orwell 1 
On August 1, 1953 Congress approved House Resolution 108, terminating the federal 
government’s recognition of sovereignty for five of the largest American Indian nations, the 
Flathead, Klamath, Menominee, Pottowatomie, and Turtle Mountain Chippewa (Wilkinson, 
2005, p. 57). Announced as the new direction of Indian affairs, termination signaled the decline 
of New Deal enthusiasm for tribal sovereignty. From 1953 to 1960, Utah Senator Arthur V. 
Watkins and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Commissioner Dillon S. Myer, with Congressional 
support, reoriented federal Indian policy to align with Cold War ideologies of national unity, 
anti-Communism, and cultural homogeneity. Termination disbanded federally-recognized tribes, 
removed their tax exemptions, ended federal assistance, and extinguished fishing and hunting 
rights. Nonetheless, Watkins and Myer insisted that termination was in American Indians’ best 
interests. They spoke euphemistically of termination as an Indian freedom program that would 
emancipate tribes from paternalism, create formal equality, facilitate self-reliance, and bestow 
Indians with citizenship. 
Despite Watkins and Myer’s bold claims, termination reversed decades of policies that 
enabled tribes to recover millions of acres of land. Fixico (1986) argues that “termination 
threatened the very core of the American Indian existence – its culture” (p. 183). Termination 
contributed to a decline in funds for health, education, employment, and resource management. 
Fixico concludes that during the termination era “the government processed 109 cases of 
termination affecting 1,369,000 acres of Indian land and an estimated 12,000 Indians” (p. 183). 
By individualizing ownership, termination opened tribal lands and assets to private sale and 
commercial development, frequently against the expressed interest of the tribe in question.  
In this essay, I examine how Watkins and Myer successfully defined termination - a 
policy inimical to tribal sovereignty - as American Indian liberation. They used terms connoting 
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individual rights such as freedom and equality to redefine assimilation as an ethical duty. Such 
rhetoric mystified the ways in which termination served the economic freedoms of non-Indians 
interested in exploiting tribal lands. Watkins and Myer’s rhetoric demonstrates the recurring 
failure of individual rights rhetoric to facilitate American Indian self-determination. They 
inverted historic Indian demands to escape paternalism into an antithetical argument for 
assimilation into mainstream society. Termination rhetoric garnered strong support because it 
accessed ideological narratives of American democracy rooted in liberal capitalism. In this 
assessment, I am guided by Koppes’ (1977) insight that “in formulating policy for native 
American societies, mainstream Americans often reveal not so much their concern for Indian 
realities as their image of what society at large should be” (p. 544).  
In the policy rhetoric of termination, Indians were not removed but liberated from their 
reservations; not deprived of federal protection but unburdened from paternalism. Reservations 
were not homelands but prisons. These discourses exhibit the rhetorical features of social control 
that unfold in George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949), a vision of a dystopian society 
governed by a corrupt language of inverted and unified opposites in which “war is peace, 
freedom is slavery, ignorance is strength” (p. 10). Further, because termination rhetoric unified 
emancipatory terms with oppositional meanings, it functioned like Orwellian Newspeak. 
Revisiting the insights of Orwell on language and his theorization by Herbert Marcuse (1964), I 
advance an Orwellian critique of political language to expose how capitalist interests are 
sustained by unifying opposed principles. Orwell and Marcuse can guide critics interested in 
demystifying discourses that consolidate power under the banner of social liberation. Focusing 
on the exemplary case of termination, this analysis animates the workings of Orwellian language, 
its potentially dangerous consequences, and alternatives for resistance. 
 Orwell 3 
The Critique of One-Dimensional Language 
 
In Nineteen Eighty-Four, the official language of Newspeak replaced Old English with 
the aim of liquidating subversive thought. Freedom, peace, and equality were redefined as their 
opposites and emblematized in the state party slogan: “War is Peace.” The unification of 
opposites negated the anti-authoritarian language of protest. Orwell (1949) wrote that “the 
special function of certain Newspeak words, of which oldthink was one, was not so much to 
express meanings as to destroy them” (p. 311). Newspeak inoculated its authoritarian purveyors 
against discourses of dissent and laid siege to oppositional reasoning by promoting doublethink, 
a cognitive practice of reconciling contradictory ideas through the manipulation of language. 
Orwell’s concern with the corruption of language and its fusion with repressive state functions 
directed social theorists to examine discourse as a constructive feature, rather than representative 
element, of totalitarian society (Orwell, 1946). John Rodden (2003) writes that for Orwell, “the 
corruption of language … could fatally undermine freedom and open the door to tyranny” (p. 
21).  
Though this allegory provided a poignant critique of Soviet communism, Orwell 
explained how linguistic mystification was fashioned as a method of social control in the West. 
A devout Democratic Socialist, Orwell did not intend Nineteen Eighty-Four to defend freedom 
as defined under Western capitalism (Hitchens, 2002; Kellner, 1984). Herbert Marcuse (1964) 
explains the significance of Orwellian thought for critical theory: 
[T]he fact that the prevailing mode of freedom is servitude, and that the prevailing mode 
of equality is superimposed inequality is barred from expression by the closed definition 
of these concepts in terms of the powers which shape the respective universe of 
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discourse. The result is the familiar Orwellian language (“peace is war,” and “war is 
peace,” etc.), which is by no means that of terroristic totalitarianism only. (pp. 88-89) 
Marcuse directed Orwell’s critique toward the parallel rise of new forms of social repression in 
the West, observing that capitalist societies stabilized themselves through integrated 
consumption and production of false needs and the advancement of technological control. In 
such societies “the very mechanism which ties the individual to his society has changed, and 
social control is anchored in the new needs which it has produced” (p. 9). He used Orwellian 
language to describe how the key terms of social liberation generally associated with class 
struggle become unified with their opposites to nullify critical thought. In Douglas Kellner’s 
(1984) words Orwellian language “smooth[s] over social contradictions and problems, and thus 
restricts thought and public discourse to the terms and interests of the established society” (p. 
258).  
 Marcuse’s critique unmasks the discursive practices that obscure exploitation and erode 
critical reasoning faculties (Bonefield, 2001; Horkheimer, 1992; Marx, 1867/1983, p. 77). With 
rationalizations superimposed over social contradictions, Marcuse argues that reason under 
capitalism assumes the primordial properties from which it proclaims to ascend: 
Today, the mystifying elements are mastered and employed in productive publicity, 
propaganda, and politics. Magic, witchcraft, and ecstatic surrender are practiced in the 
daily routine of the home, the shop, and the office and the rational accomplishments 
conceal the irrationality of the whole. (p. 190) 
The unification of opposites conflates reason with reality, name with function, and essence with 
existence. Kellner (1984) writes that “reason has identified itself with the reality: what is actual 
is reasonable, although what is reasonable has not yet become reality” (p. 231). This shift in the 
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locus of mystification is an ideological iteration of post-industrial rationality in which, “the 
rational rather than the irrational becomes the most effective vehicle of mystification” (p. 189).  
 Marcuse’s turn to Orwell was motivated by two concerns. The first was his “repressive 
tolerance” thesis which held that the state and capital maintained power through permitting 
dissent while employing discursive cooptation strategies (Marcuse, 1969). The second is one 
shared by rhetorical theorists: the tendency of political vocabularies to malfunction. Burke (1969, 
1959) observed the atrophy of reason through casuistic stretching, a mode of argument employed 
to resolve moral concerns by applying abstract principles to specific cases. Casuistry is moral 
reasoning abstracted from historical analogies followed by generalized maxims for situated 
moral decision-making (Jonsen & Toulmin, 1988, p. 257). Wright (2006) argues that casuistic 
stretching can impoverish analogical reasoning through “the deliberate bending of an argument’s 
topic and scope” (p. 55). Like Marcuse, Burke (1984) suggests that argument by analogy can 
erode disparate categories of reasoning through rationalization: “the breakdown in our categories 
of the ‘proper’ is now so thorough that this transplantation of words into ‘inappropriate’ settings 
is constantly with us” (p. 109). In what Marcuse calls one-dimensional language, analogical 
reasoning concerning the situated application of principles such as liberty and equality are 
invoked ad nauseam without reflection on their polyvalent historical meaning.  
McGee (1980) argues that part of the problem is that rhetorical situations are never 
perfectly similar. Ideographs, or politically resonant “ordinary language term[s] found in 
political discourse,” are employed to establish connections between diachronic and synchronic 
contexts (p.15). Ideographs such as equality acquire meaning through application to their 
comparatively appropriate present-day usages. Analogies can malfunction to the extent that 
rhetors overlook disparate contextual meanings. McGee notes that “such instances have the 
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potential to change the structure of ideographs and hence the ‘present’ ideology” (p. 14). 
Inconsistent usages of ideographs distort historical precedent and flatten diachronic meanings to 
justify antithetical courses of action. In such cases, liberal ideographs can be employed to 
conflate diachronic with synchronic meanings, transforming the terms historic connotations. 
Aune (1994) suggests that Marcuse was similarly concerned with both the failure of political 
vocabularies and the functionalization of language, “the tendency to substitute signal responses 
to language for critical thought” (p. 83). This mirrors McGee’s observation that political slogans 
can be “easily mistaken for the technical terminology of political philosophy” (p. 5). Further, by 
structuring society’s ideological commitments, ideographs can produce deferential responses to 
reiterated political language. 
 Concerned with deceptive political vocabularies, some critics have employed approaches 
that can be characterized as demystification (Aune, 1999; Cloud, 2003; Edelman, 1977, 2001; 
Pei, 1973; Schiappa, 1989), a Marxist strategy of uncovering false consciousness, or a social 
superstructure imposed over an unequal base that conceals the exploitative conditions of 
production (Foulkes, 1983). Applied to the ideological function of language, McGee (1984, 
1982) and Wander (1984, 1983) contend that discourse serves agents of social and economic 
power. Critics, thus, should fashion their interpretative capacities to understand, in Cloud’s 
(1994) words “how political and economic power is mediated, reinforced, perpetuated, and 
challenged in the texts we study” (p. 143). Here I am less concerned with relative truth or falsity 
of termination rhetoric than its plausibility, or fidelity to capitalist ideology. I am guided by 
McGee’s (1980) proposition that political languages are not “important because of their fiction 
… but because of their truth, their links with the trick-of-the-mind that deludes individuals into 
believing that they ‘think’ with/for/through a social organism” (p. 15).  
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Cloud (2003) provides a foundation for criticism of one-dimensional language, arguing 
that “the left must use the resources of demystification - which means countering emotion with 
reason - in the process of building a counter-hegemonic movement” (para. 15). Cloud elaborates 
further: 
[D]eliberation includes the capacity to seek out and entertain multiple positions on a 
given event, the capacity to historicize events, the capacity to weigh competing evidence 
and reasoning and discard the less credible, the capacity to probe the motivation of 
discourses and adhere to those with the fewest privately motivated sponsors, and the 
capacity to take action based on this deliberative process. (para. 37)  
The goal, then, of demystification is to introduce multidimensional thought against the 
unification of opposites, or otherwise deceptive political vocabularies. Advancing Cloud’s 
argument, I argue that critics must also counter rationalization with reason. Demystification 
demands the reintroduction of rejoinder and reciprocity into dominant discourse, holding 
abridged, contradictory language to the light of critical reason. 
Marcuse and Orwell offer a supplemental critical language. As Aune (1994) notes, 
rhetoric theorists would glean insights from Marcuse’s contribution; however, “it has been 
insufficiently acknowledged that Marcuse is preeminently a philosopher of communication” (p. 
76). Turning to Orwell, Marcuse sought to emancipate discourse from instrumental rationality. 
Combining theory and practice, Marcuse (1964) defends “the emancipation of consciousness,” 
arguing that “[w]ithout it all emancipation of the senses, all radical activism, remains blind, self-
defeating. Political practice still depends on theory…on Reason” (p. 131). Concerned with the 
relationship between discourse and economic oppression, Marcuse’s critique of Orwellian 
language emphasizes the social power of signifying practice while also foregrounding the 
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primacy of materialist interests in sustaining and challenging social domination (Best & Kellner, 
1991). Further, since both Marcuse and Orwell theorized the communication practices governing 
capitalism during the Cold War, the conditions through which their critical insights emerged 
aligned with the context in which termination gained favor.  
Termination’s Contexts 
 
 Termination garnered support by accessing Cold War discourses emphasizing cultural 
homogeneity and individualism in contradistinction to Soviet communism (Philip, 2005; Rosier, 
2006). Metcalf (2002) argues that termination was a “type of ideological combat,” which even 
for those who defended the welfare of tribes, “devolved into a struggle over land and resources” 
(p. 3). To connect their objectives to national unity and American capitalism, terminationists 
employed liberal ideographs of freedom, equality, and self-reliance. These terms evoked 
nationalist pride in democracy and emphasized the absence of those values in Soviet 
Communism. More broadly, termination rhetoric was situated within the American liberal 
tradition, in which freedoms were derived from a Lockean notion of property and labor.  
Cold War Anti-Communism 
Anti-communism made assimilation a necessary goal for Indian affairs. Under John 
Collier (1933-1945) the BIA had supported policies that preserved tribal self-governance. In 
1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), which prohibited individualized 
allotment of tribal lands, established procedures for adjudicating federal land claims, and 
established tribal constitutions (Nagel, 1997. Prior to the IRA, Indian policy was governed by 
assimilationist impulses reflected by the policy of allotment. The Dawes Act (1887) divided 
reservations into individual holdings under the assumption that private ownership would 
encourage agricultural cultivation and Euro-American lifestyles (Debo, 1984; Marks, 1998, pp. 
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216-220). Despite treaty guarantees, allotment resulted in the loss of nearly 90 million acres of 
tribal lands by 1934 (Wilkinson, 2005, p. 43). With Collier’s support, the IRA gave tribes a legal 
mechanism to recover lands lost through allotment.  
Communal land ownership became a concern when Indian administrators felt pressure to 
align Indian policy with Cold War imperatives. A New Deal supporter, Collier was accused of 
being a Communist by members of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs for supporting tribal 
sovereignty (Finger, 1993, pp. 89-90). Collier’s exit from the BIA and the rise of anti-
communism shifted the priorities of Indian affairs toward assimilation. Senator Joseph 
McCarthy’s paranoid inquisitions from 1949 to 1954 promoted suspicion of Communist 
influence in American government and, consequently, distorted how New Deal programs were 
portrayed. Whitfield (1996) argues: 
The Cold War put the reformist strategies of the New Deal and the Fair Deal on ice, as 
though those experiments were part of the continuum that stretched all the way to 
Moscow. From the perspective of a resurgent right, the regulation of capitalist abuses that 
Roosevelt had begun easily shaded into something more sinister. (p. 19) 
Programs promoting cultural pluralism or restraining capitalism were viewed with suspicion. 
Related, the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act called for exclusion of foreign aliens with beliefs or ties 
to Communism, Socialism, and Anarchism (Wilkinson, 2005, p. 64). Edward Lazarus (1999) 
identifies synergy between the nativist sentiment expressed in McCarran-Walter and the rise of 
pro-assimilation forces. Anti-communists and nativists shared a commitment to national unity, 
expressed strong antipathy toward otherness, and were suspicious of deviations from the 
mainstream.  
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 President Truman’s appointment of Dillon S. Myer as BIA commissioner in 1950 secured 
the defeat of Collier’s principles. Possessing no direct experience in Indian affairs, Myer’s 
credentials included directing the War Relocation Authority, responsible for administrating 
Japanese internment during World War II. A vocal supporter of assimilation, Myer was one of 
the architects of termination. Drinnon (1987) argues that Myer was an unapologetic nationalist 
and a cold-hearted bureaucrat, his career reaching “out laterally to become an expression of 
Western racism, nationalism, imperialism, and colonialism and in that global context added 
confirmation of Hannah Arendt’s insights into ‘the banality of evil’” (p. xxviii). Influenced by 
Protestantism, Myer embraced the cultural melting-pot and firmly opposed cultural pluralism 
(Philip, 1989). In office, he designed urban relocation programs and encouraged white adoption 
of Indian children. Post-war changes in BIA policy made Myer’s efforts relatively easy. In 1947, 
Assistant BIA Commissioner William T. Zimmerman Jr. compiled a report known as the 
Doomsday Book, categorizing the tribes that were most prepared for assimilation. Fortunate 
Eagle (2002) observes that in 1952 the Department of Interior compiled a 1,800 page document 
that calculated the expense of maintaining federal protections and determined that, “twenty-three 
western tribes controlled a third of the nation’s low-sulfur coal, fully 80 percent of the country’s 
uranium reserves, and from 3 to 10 percent of national reserves in gas and petroleum” (p. 17). 
They calculated that termination would be a cost-efficient way to develop tribal natural resources 
(Churchill & LaDuke, 1992; Fixico, 1998; Weyler, 1984). 
Termination also complemented prevailing paradigms of minority rights. Cold Warriors 
were wary that indigenous self-determination and decolonization had the potential to destabilize 
the capitalist order. African-Americans’ civil rights, however, advanced during the termination 
decade, including the landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision (1954), in large measure 
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because desegregation converged with the ideological interests of Cold Warriors in enhancing 
the American image abroad (Bell, 1980; Dudziak, 1988, 2002; Wilson, 2003). This integrationist 
approach confused assimilation and detribalization with desegregation. Differences mattered, as 
Deloria (1971) argues, because where they systematically segregated African Americans, whites 
had “force-fed the Indian what he was denying the black” (p. 173). Unlike desegregation, 
however, American Indian sovereignty was confused with divisive cultural separatism.  
Lockean individualism 
The extension of freedom and equality was enabled by each term’s historic connection to 
private property. John Locke (1689/1965) argued that civil society was organized around the 
maximization of property. As owners of their labor power, Locke reasoned that individuals could 
claim ownership over that which one transformed in the natural world. Life, liberty and estate 
were natural rights guaranteed by the social contract between individuals and government. 
Locke’s philosophy was embraced by American colonists as a rationale for both revolution and 
dispossession of Indian lands. Hall (2003) observes that because of his Eurocentric view of 
property “Locke’s Two Treatises have been among the most influential texts ever written to 
provide legal or moral justifications for the dispossession and genocide of Indigenous peoples” 
(p. 185). Whereas European political philosophers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau viewed 
property as the root of social inequality, early Americans enthusiastically adopted Locke because 
his theories were “well suited to empire” (Engels, 2005, p. 360).  
Locke’s concept of property buttressed the European doctrine of discovery which 
guaranteed in customary law that land claims in the Americas were property of discovering 
nations. The doctrine advanced the notion that Indian lands were vacant, awaiting to be subdued 
by European settlement (Deloria, 1985). From tribal perspectives, lands considered vacant to 
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American colonists were fully cultivated. Marks (1998) contends that Indian land ownership was 
“the right simply to use its resources by hunting, gathering, and planting using nonintrusive 
methods” (xxii). Hall notes that Euro-Americans ignored unobtrusive forms of Indian 
horticulture (p. 184). Myths that Indians lacked any concept of ownership were not verifiable 
political facts but rationalizations for dispossession.  
Freedom in principle often meant the pursuit of a Eurocentric concept of private property 
in practice. The natural rights vocabulary contracted to individualist connotations of property at 
odds with Indian sovereignty. The diachronic meaning of freedom as property explains how 
termination proponents were able to contort natural rights as a justification for replacing 
communal ownership with privatized allotments. Lockean notions of freedom were the engines 
of liberal capitalism, emphasizing the accumulation of wealth and the expansion of private 
enterprise; however, for Locke’s contemporaries such as Rousseau, and later Marx, Fredrick 
Engels, Louis Henry Morgan, and Native intellectuals Joseph Brant and Tecumseh, freedom was 
maximized by transcending private property and its byproducts of inequality. Thus, dormant 
Lockean individualism buttressed non-Indian rationales for expropriating tribal lands.  
The Orwellian Language of Termination 
 
In the remainder of this essay, I critique three phrasing strategies employed by Watkins 
and Myer that demonstrate the features of Orwellian language: termination as emancipation, 
termination as self-reliance, and reservations as prisons. To sketch what I call termination 
rhetoric, I focus on the policy’s architects: Watkins and Myer. Both individuals devoted large 
portions of their political careers to termination, led Congressional hearings, and wrote the 
foundational articles that justified termination to policy-makers. Throughout, I provide examples 
where other policy-makers adopted their vocabulary. Though it is beyond the scope of this essay 
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to examine all 109 termination cases, the generic features of termination rhetoric can be 
extrapolated from the arguments circulated by Watkins and Myers. I examine portions of their 
writing and testimony in defense of the termination cases initiated by H.R. 108 to demonstrate 
the application of their rhetorical principles in practice.  
Termination as emancipation 
 
 Terminationists made painstaking efforts to convince policy-makers that assimilation was 
a policy of liberation. To accomplish this, H.R. 108 was framed by natural rights language:  
Whereas it is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians within 
the territorial limits of the United States subject to the same laws and entitled to the same 
privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the United States, to 
end their status as wards of the United States, and to grant them all of the rights and 
prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship. (H.R. 108, 1953) 
Associating termination with words such as freedom, emancipation, and liberation, 
terminationists redefined assimilation as the fulfillment of a Native civil rights agenda and thus, 
an ethical obligation. As termination gained momentum, many couched their efforts in the 
language of liberalism. Former commissioner Zimmerman (1957) evoked the language of 
equality and citizenship to defend termination: “Indians should be subjected as rapidly as 
possible to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as other 
American citizens” (p. 40). Similarly, Montana Senator George Malone (1949) asserted the 
natural rights argument for citizenship because Indians were “born of the fact that they do not 
have equal opportunities and privileges, as compared to other American citizens” (as cited in 
Fixico, 1986, p. 54). 
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There were no more fervent defenders of termination than Watkins and Myer. Watkins 
(1957) wrote that the aim of termination was to create “‘equality before the law’” and that “our 
course should rightly be no other” (p. 55). Arguing he was duty bound, Watkins asserted that 
“firm and constant consideration for those of Indian ancestry should lead us all to work diligently 
and carefully for the full realization of their national citizenship with all other Americans” (p. 
55). The ethical obligation to assimilate Indians relied on a spurious analogy to African 
American civil rights, leading Watkins to frequently conflate desegregation with Indian self-
determination. Myer also compared termination to desegregation when he wrote, “I believe that 
we should move as fast as possible toward assisting the Indians in the country to become 
integrated into the general pattern rather than being maintained in segregated groups” (as cited in 
Wilson, 1950, p. 99). Summoning the Fourteenth Amendment to his cause, Myer (1953) argued 
that the “constitution provides that ‘all persons born or naturalized in the United States…are 
citizens of the United States,’” thus, “not only are Indians today American citizens; they are 
citizens of the several states” (p. 193).  
Note that throughout the 1950s, civil rights activism was predominantly integrationist, 
directed at eliminating formal segregation and public discrimination in schools, housing, 
transportation, and the military (Dierenfield, 2008). Prior to the direct action tactics of the 1960s, 
the prevailing ideology of racial justice was, in the words of Condit and Lucaites (1993), based 
on “Integrated Equality that included political equality, equality of economic opportunity, and 
integrated public facilities” (p. 167). Replacing separate but equal, racial justice evolved 
throughout the post-war period to include a “mathematical proportion as a test of equality” based 
on the assumption that “although there might be important cultural differences, similarity 
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outweighed difference” (p. 168). Drawing from the rhetoric of desegregation, Watkins (1953) 
conflated Indian emancipation with equal access to public goods: 
Virtually since the first decade of our national life the Indian, as tribesman and 
individual, was accorded a status apart. Now, however, we think constructively and 
affirmatively of the Indian as a fellow American. We seek to assure that in health, 
education, welfare, in social, political, economic, and cultural opportunity, he or she 
stands as one with us in the enjoyment and responsibilities of our national citizenship. (p. 
47) 
Here, Watkins positioned termination within intergrationist logics of minority-rights, assuming 
that like African-Americans, the Indian’s “status apart” was to blame for inequality and that 
desegregation would provide desired access to public institutions. Thus, Indian self-
determination was redefined within the context of citizenship not inherent tribal sovereignty. The 
problem with “Indian wardship,” he argued, was that it privileged race over citizenship, “treating 
the Indian of today as an Indian, rather than as a fellow American citizen” (p 48). Watkins then 
pursued misguided, color-blind forms of racial equality. 
 His analogy did not end with the civil rights movement. He aligned termination with the 
abolition of slavery and H.R. 108 with Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation. 
Comparing himself to a modern-day Lincoln, Watkins (1957) wrote of termination: “following 
in the footsteps of the Emancipation Proclamation ninety-four years ago, I see the following 
words emblazoned in letters of fire above the heads of the Indians – THESE PEOPLE SHALL 
BE FREE!” (p. 55). Here, Watkins aligned himself with an entire history of racial struggle. An 
expression of hubris, Watkin’s alignment with nineteenth- and twentieth-century civil rights 
advocacy also inoculated termination proponents against suggestions that they possessed self-
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interested motives concerning tribal resources. Termination was constructed as an ethical 
obligation to enfranchise Indians despite the political costs. A red herring fallacy par excellence, 
his comparison drew attention to the ethical and emotive principles of equality at work in the 
struggle for African American civil rights, overlooking the fundamental differences between the 
two.  
Watkins casuistic reasoning transferred to federal warship the ethical principle that would 
motivate a rejection of slavery. Veiled comparisons between wardship and slavery were, 
however, dangerous. Explaining the costs of conflating desegregation with Indian self-
determination, Deloria (1971) argues that in such arguments “the white man presented the 
problem of each group in contradictory ways so that neither black nor Indian could understand 
exactly where the problem existed or how to solve it” (p. 173). In an effort to transfer the 
conventionally affective responses toward abolition and desegregation to termination, Watkins’ 
analogy did a disservice to both. He used casuistry to stand in the place of sound reasoning, and, 
in the process, undermined a clear analytical assessment of the disparate causes of Indian 
oppression.  
To dispel comparisons between termination and previous legislation dispossessing tribal 
lands, Watkins (1953) asserted that federal Indian policy had always been guided by ethical 
principles: “historically … the Congress, although perhaps more or less ineffectively until recent 
years, has sought in the nineteenth and early twentieth century to free the Indian. A full study of 
Congressional actions will bear this out. Freedom for the Indian was the goal then; it is the goal 
now” (p. 48). Watkins suggested that with historical perspective, termination would be judged as 
the apex of a continuous effort to liberate American Indians. By suggesting that the goal of 
federal policy had always been Indian emancipation, Watkins rewrote the history of removal and 
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dispossession as a series of well-intentioned mistakes easily remedied by termination. In fact, he 
highlighted historical moments in which allotment was the federal policy as those in which 
American Indians were on the path to liberation, a claim many tribal leaders would dispute.  
Watkins argued that termination reconnected Indian affairs with its supposed ethical 
foundations, that “in the postdepression years Congress - realizing this change of policy - sought 
to return to the historic principles of much earlier decades” (p. 48). Termination provided the 
appropriate remedy, serving as the tribal Emancipation Proclamation or Brown decision. Watkins 
suggested that policy-makers meditate on the historic significance of the moment:  
This was a most worthy moment in our history. We should all dwell upon its deep 
meaning. Considering the lengthy span of our Indian relationship, the recency of this 
event is significant. Obviously, such affirmative action for the great majority of Indians 
has just begun. (p. 48) 
Myer (1953) echoed Watkins by suggesting that termination was “one of the most important 
milestones in the history of American Indian affairs,” a “landmark in the history of Indian 
legislation” (p. 193). 
Watkins (1957) dubiously concluded that he was a civil rights leader. He anticipated 
harsh rebuke; however, argued that equality was won only through righteous determination. 
Disagreement was inevitable, but “as with any such major social concern, methods vary in 
proposed solutions and emotions sometimes rise as to how the final goal should best be reached. 
A clear understanding of principles and events is necessary” (p. 47). He contended that because 
termination was a moral issue, it transcended political considerations. As a result, any dissent 
was anti-Indian: 
 Orwell 18 
After all, the matter of freeing the Indian from wardship status is not rightfully a subject 
to debate in academic fashion, with facts marshaled here and there to be maneuvered and 
counter-maneuvered in a vast battle of words and ideas. Much more I see this as an ideal 
or universal truth, to which all men subscribe, and concerning which they differ only in 
their opinion as to how the ideal may be attained and to what degree and during what 
period of time. (p. 47) 
Placing himself above politics, he expressed disinterest in winning a debate through reasoned 
argument. Instead, he elevated termination to a universal ethical principle. As such, he asserted 
that common ground existed for agreement based on shared ethical investments in civil rights. 
Although some opponents may have disagreed with its logistics, they should be moved by their 
conscience to agree that native enfranchisement was a moral imperative.  
 Watkins also inverted arguments concerning corporate exploitation of tribal resources. 
He suggested that termination would remove special interests from Indian affairs and provide for 
tribal control of natural resources: “special interests are of course involved in other ways; thus 
commercial companies having specific reservation leases may be reluctant to see terminal 
programs proceed, feeling that their own economic interests may be jeopardized” (p. 48). In 
many cases, however, wardship protected tribal lands from corporate development, particularly 
in forest conservation, where BIA regulations mandated sustainable forestry and curtailed 
exploitative timber contracts on tribal lands. Under federal protection, the Klamath tribe 
sustained nearly 2 million dollars in timber sales prior to 1950 and the Menominee survived by a 
thriving sawmill (Fixico, 1986, pp. 116-117). Removing BIA timber restrictions, termination 
opened forests to individual sale and facilitated corporate control of tribal timber. Federal 
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protections contributed to the economic autonomy of the Klamath and Menominee, the same 
evidence marshaled by Watkins to support the claim that tribes were ready for termination.  
Watkins insisted that private interests were advanced by keeping Indians as wards 
“because a few well-intentioned private organizations repeatedly seek to influence Congress to 
keep the Indian in a restricted status by urging legislation to retain him as an Indian ward and as 
a member of a caste with social status apart from others” (p. 48). Here, Watkins presented a 
glaring contradiction. As the argument proceeded, because wardship stunted economic 
development many tribes were dependent on federal resources. Termination would enable them 
to escape paternalism; however, the relative autonomy of tribes such as the Klamath and the 
Menominee demonstrated they had, paradoxically, outgrown the need for protection. He 
portrayed tribes as simultaneously impoverished and autonomous. Either way, termination was 
the answer. To smooth over contradictions, he accused opponents of practicing deception and 
harboring hidden economic motives, arguing that “private organizations and serious-minded 
periodicals have been used as devices propagandizing viewpoints based upon assertions known 
to Congress to be contrary to the facts upon Indian conditions” (p. 48). As the argument went, 
those who opposed termination had something to gain from wardship and because Watkins was 
driven by lofty principles, his motives were beyond reproach.  
Termination as self-reliance 
 Terminationists embraced a religio-capitalist ideology of free labor, reframing their effort 
as advancing what Max Weber (1958) termed the Protestant work ethic. Within this ideology, 
frugal and persistent labor was a virtuous article of faith. In addition to a mathematical litmus 
test for Indian equality, terminationists sought to debunk traditional Indian values that, in their 
estimation, encouraged dependence. An expression of bourgeois morality, Protestant values of 
 Orwell 20 
thrift and industriousness were the driving force behind the private accumulation of wealth. 
Under capitalism, entrepreneurialism and self-reliance acquire moral and even religious 
significance. In this regard, Myer’s Protestant influence was pronounced. Drinnon (1987) writes 
that “he was a walking repository of the Puritan virtues and traditional hostility to the very idea 
of the survival of separate peoples with separate cultures” (p. xxviii). Watkins, a devout Mormon 
also embraced a religio-capitalist work ethic that led them to believe that Indians lacked self-
reliance (Peroff, 1982, p. 60). Watkins’ Mormon religious beliefs influenced his approach to 
termination in other ways. In the Book of Mormon, Indians were the fallen people of American 
civilization, their skin genetically transmuted by God as punishment for their sins. Doctrine 
holds that it is a Mormon’s duty to restore the Indian’s status in God’s Kingdom. Metcalf (2002) 
argues that for Mormons “to ‘elevate’ Indians means to convert and assimilate them” (p. 13). 
Fusing religious duty with capitalist morality, termination became a moral and economic 
imperative. 
With references to innate abilities and self-reliance, Watkins expressed a desire to help 
Indians adopt capitalist values. He argued that termination would place Indians in a position 
“where they would actually have had to go to work and to take care of their own affairs” (as 
cited in Wilkinson, 2005, p. 69). Watkins (1957) elaborated: 
Self-reliance is basic to the whole Indian-freedom program. Through our national historic 
development the Indian was forced into a dependent position with the federal government 
more and more, as America advanced westward, tending to sublimate his natural qualities 
of self-reliance, course, discipline, resourcefulness, confidence, and faith in the future. (p. 
51) 
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Asserting that self-reliance and individualism were immutable human characteristics, 
terminationists naturalized their religio-capitalist work ethic and established it as a prerequisite to 
formal equality. Conversely, terminationists also suggested that the collective values of the 
reservation (communal property, sharing) were byproducts of a structured ideology of 
dependence. Once paternalism was eliminated, the veil of ignorance would be lifted and the 
distorted and characteristically socialist ideologies of the reservation would be demystified. For 
example, Watkins (1957) argued that relocation programs displayed Indians’ innate yet dormant 
abilities: “through the Bureau’s relocation program increasing thousands of energetic, healthy, 
skilled Indians compete successfully in our cities, bring their families into new modern homes, 
and thus in effect remove many conditions of their earlier wardship” (p. 49). Presenting capitalist 
morality as natural, this rhetoric constructed Indian cultural values as debilitating false 
ideologies. Termination established both a mathematical and moral litmus test for equality 
achieved through integration and value transformation.  
 Terminationists argued that because of structured dependence, Indians could not develop 
their innate abilities. Concerning Menominee termination, Watkins argued that “here we have a 
group of people who have innate ability just the same as other people, when they get stimulated 
with a little ambition and a little necessity. You know, necessity is said to be the mother of 
invention. It is the spur to drive us to do things we don’t think we can’t do” (as cited in 
Wilkinson, 2005, p. 75). When tribes resisted, he contorted their efforts into evidence of their 
innate abilities. During the Ute termination hearings, Watkins retorted: “you have enough 
judgment and intelligence you think to come here and say ‘no’ to us. In effect, you are saying 
‘No, we don’t want this.’ Haven’t you got enough courage to say ‘No’ to the fellow who comes 
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along and wants to buy your land?” (as cited in Wilkinson, 2005, p. 75). Put differently, if tribes 
could resist federal dispossession, they could resist corporate influence.  
Watkins also argued that federal dependence was undemocratic, “that what the Indian 
really wants; he wants representation without taxation. He can tax all the rest of us and vote for 
people who do tax us; but he doesn’t want to pay taxes himself even though he is able to do so” 
(as cited in Fixico, 1986, p. 105). Elsewhere he argued that Indians “want all the benefits of the 
things we have, highways, schools, hospitals, everything that civilization furnishes, but they 
don’t want to help pay their share of it” (as cited in Wilkinson, 2005, p. 69). Watkins reframed 
federal protections as special rights. For Watkins, legal equality required the performance of 
patriotic duties, earned only by the full utilization of one’s own innate abilities. In Watkins’ 
(1957) words, Indians would “at last have full control of their own affairs and would possess all 
of the attributes of complete American citizenship” (p. 48).  
Watkins (1957) also redefined existing protection as dispossession. He asserted that by 
returning to pre-depression policies, termination would bestow tribes with full sovereignty. 
Despite the fact that the IRA provided tribes with recourse in federal courts to adjudicate their 
land claims, he asserted that such protections were against tribal interests. Watkins (1957) 
referred to federal protections as restrictions and termination as decontrol: “[t]he Indian freedom 
program will not be accomplished immediately in the case of more large and complex situations, 
but for most tribes it can be numbered in a few years” because, he continued, “the careful 
clarification and protection of rights, these at times serve to make the process of decontrol 
lengthy” (p. 49). Here, he implied that constitutional rights provided the necessary federal 
protections. He continued, “[o]ne facet of this over-all development concerns the freeing of the 
Indian from special federal restrictions on the property and the person of the tribes and their 
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members” (p. 47). The restrictions he spoke of, however, prohibited allotment. Other restrictions 
were intended to prohibit exploitative timber and mineral contracts. What’s more, by treaty, 
tribes already possessed sovereign control over communally-held assets. Wilkinson (2005) 
argues that “although Watkins repeatedly said termination would ‘give’ them their land, the 
tribes already owned it” (p. 71). Despite his promise that termination would give Indians their 
land, tribes such as the Klamath, Menominee, and Ute lost tens of thousands of acres to 
individual sale. Self-reliance rhetoric reinforced the erroneous belief that tribes did not already 
exercise control over their own affairs.  
Reservations as prisons 
 
 Watkins and Myer argued that reservations were prisons that segregated and punished 
Indians as conquered peoples. In an address before the Western Governor’s Conference in 1952, 
Myer argued: 
Many of these reservations were something akin to large detention camps for a period of 
years when the United States government found that it was cheaper to provide rations to 
Indians than it was to fight them. During this period we had practically destroyed the 
basis of their economy, which, of course, consisted of hunting, fishing, gathering of wild 
fruits, nuts, and berries, and limited farming operations. (as cited in Drinnon 1987, p. 
237) 
Drawing from imagery of Jewish detention in Nazi Germany, Myer argued that reservations 
were temporary camps for detained prisoners of Western conquest. Conversely, terminating 
reservations was morally equivalent to liberating European concentration camps. Watkins 
echoed Myer’s conclusions when he characterized his visit to the Menominee reservation as if it 
were a gulag, noting the experience was the same “in visiting Europe, the refugee camps in the 
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Near East” (as cited in Wilkinson, p. 75). Connecting the Indian experience with that of the 
European detainee, the moral urgency for action was fundamentally the same. Hearne (2005) 
explains that such imagery “led both politicians and ordinary citizens to view reservations not as 
tribal lands but as ‘concentration camps’ for temporary detainees, rhetoric drawn from the Jewish 
experience in Europe” (p. 137). Terminationists decontextualized this emotional post-war 
experience to obfuscate the underlying causes of reservation poverty.  
 Terminationists used the geographic distance and stunted reservation economies to 
bolster their claims. Watkins (1957) wrote that “secluded reservation life is a detriment to the 
Indian, keeping him apart in ways far beyond the purely geographic” (p. 51). Focusing on the 
rural qualities of reservation life, Watkins implied that reservations were prisons that segregated 
Indians and contributed to their ongoing oppression. Myer presented distance and separation as 
the key markers of detention life and implied that relocation was the moral equivalent of 
liberation. Myer (1953) carefully distinguished his relocation programs from the forceful 
measurers of the past that were, ironically, responsible for American Indians’ remote 
segregation: 
Because of lack of education, lack of communication, language difficulties, and limited 
association with non-Indians, many Indians are afraid of the outside world. Also many 
Indians know that some of their present problems stem from the fact that their forefathers 
were once relocated. In order to do this job, we must initiate a large-scale training 
program. (p. 199) 
Myer presents a contradiction in which relocation was both the problem and solution to 
American Indian poverty. The same capitalist drive to assimilate American Indians and 
dispossess them of their vast lands was refashioned as an instrument of emancipation.  
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 Terminationists linked reservations to Soviet communism. Embry (1956) described 
reservations as experiments in “forced communism” that kept Indians “economically and 
socially chained to his reservation” (p. 210). Suggesting that communism and detention were the 
factors contributing to tribal poverty, Embry charged the BIA to “close to our concentration 
camps … The Indian then could take pride not only in being an Indian but in being an American” 
(p. 229). Terminationists blamed reservation poverty on tribal lifestyles instead of assimilative 
federal policies. They portrayed reservation life as austere, enslaved, and communistic. For 
Watkins and Myer, Indians were prisoners of their communal lifestyle. Further, by aligning 
termination with the Cold War project of defeating Soviet communism and European fascism, 
assimilationists framed their cause as a just movement for national unity and economic progress.  
The Language of Indian Liberation 
Blackfoot leader Earl Old Person (1967) wrote that “It is important to note that in our 
Indian language the only translation for termination is to ‘wipe out’ or ‘kill off.’ We have no 
Indian word for termination” (p. 18). Termination was a dangerous euphemism that when taken 
literally meant cultural extinction. The Orwellian language of termination presented confusing 
analogies, false comparisons, and fallacious racial reasoning. Even a perplexed President 
Eisenhower, approving legislation transferring tribal criminal jurisdiction to state governments 
(P.L. 280), stated that “[a]lthough I have grave doubts as to the wisdom of certain provisions in 
H.R. 1063, I have today signed it because its basic purpose represents still another step in 
granting equality to all Indians in our nation” (para. 1). Eisenhower questioned the logic of the 
legislation, yet remained enamored by its lofty principles and pathos-laden appeals to equality.  
Many terminated tribes were neither able to deflect commercial pressure to sell nor resist 
government incentives to withdraw from the tribe in exchange for one-time payments for the 
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value of their land. Three of the largest terminated tribes - Klamath, Menominee, and Ute - lost 
nearly half of their tribal members through per-capita payment (Fixico 1986, p. 185). Over a 
hundred other smaller tribes met similar fates (Stefon, 1978). Wilkinson (2005) concludes that 
terminated tribes “found themselves poorer, bereft of health care, and suffering a painful 
psychological loss of community, homeland, and self-identity” (p. 81).  
 Many Indian groups were aware of the rhetorical strategies employed by Watkins and 
Myer. The Indian Rights Association (1954) argued that “titles of bills are frequently misleading, 
so that what a bill might actually do may be entirely different from what its title would indicate” 
(as cited in Embry, 1956, p. 211). During termination hearings in 1954, Indian delegations 
traveled to Washington to protest. Many resisted termination by redefining the federal 
government’s responsibilities (Marks, 1998, pp. 284-289). Responding to Watkins’ claim that 
the government was tired being a guardian, Mohawk journalist Ernst Benedict argued “can an 
honorable Nation, just because it is tired, shrug off its responsibilities regardless of the wishes 
and conditions of the ward?” (as cited in Marks, 1998, p. 286). Some protestors blamed forced 
dependence on vacillating government policies, arguing that termination had misidentified the 
central problem with paternalism. Gordon Keshna (Menominee) argued that, “you cannot ask the 
people to go on their own and govern themselves now when for all those years they have not 
been permitted to do anything for themselves” (as cited in Fixico, 1986, pp. 95-96). A 
representative of the Colville tribe argued that termination was abandonment by another name, 
that Indians “did not want to be wards of the government …neither did they want to be flung 
suddenly into the sea of the larger American society” (as cited in Dahl, 1994, p. 42). Protestors 
refuted that Indians needed to be taught self-reliance by having their treaties abdicated. Self-
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reliance, they argued, would be facilitated by devolving control of Indian affairs to tribal 
governments, not by disbanding them. 
 American Indians asserted the necessity of land to self-determination and challenged the 
portrayal of their homelands as prisons. A Colville resident argued to the Senate that “this land is 
the most important part of my life and the Indian people that live on it for existence and 
happiness” (as cited in Dahl, 1986, p. 43). In a similar comment, another Colville resident 
argued, “I can go fishing and hunting when I get hungry, I can cut my own wood whenever I run 
out of wood, sell some” (as cited in Marks, 1998, p. 286). Reservation residents argued that the 
land provided self-reliance. Terminationists, however, revoked the treaty-guaranteed fishing and 
hunting rights that encouraged tribal self-sufficiency. They considered those special rights. 
Contrary to Watkins’ (1957) argument that termination would not “affect the retention of those 
cultural and racial qualities which people of Indian descent would wish to retain,” traditional 
reservation residents argued their lands were necessary to preserve cultural heritage (p. 48). 
Deloria (1970) would observe later: “[n]o movement can sustain itself, no people can continue, 
no government can function, and no religion can become a reality except it be bound to a land 
area of its own” (p. 179).  
 These arguments did not dissuade Watkins and Myer. Other forms of activism, however, 
were successful. One of the ironies of termination, Nagel (1996) argues was that “American 
Indian mobilization and ethnic renewal arose in part out of the federal programs designed to 
terminate the special status of Indian tribes and to absorb Indian people into mainstream society” 
(p. 118). Urban relocation contributed to the rise of pan-Indian ethnic identification in the inner-
city and direct action protests (Johnson, 2007). Coming into closer contact in the inner-city, 
Indians developed community organizations to combat discrimination and the BIA. Under the 
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slogan of Red Power, new militant forms of activism developed, driven by younger radical 
elements in the inner-city. These groups worked outside of the conventions of Indian affairs, 
fashioning direct action strategies to reverse the effects of termination.  
 The rhetoric of termination demonstrates how emancipating political language can be 
affixed to antithetical goals. Edelman (1974) observes that “when it suits us to see rationalization 
as reason, repression as help, distortion as creation, or the converse of any of these, language and 
mind can smoothly structure each other to do so” (p. 45). In cases in which social power is at 
stake “distortion and misperception are virtually certain to occur” (p. 45). Some critics argue that 
such is the fate of ideographs such as patriotism, security, and terrorism in the political 
vocabulary of the “war on terrorism” (Brock, Huglen, & Klump, 2005; Winkler, 2005). For 
example, the USA Patriot Act, which significantly expanded law enforcement powers to detain 
individuals without habeas corpus, conduct warrantless searches, and engage in domestic 
surveillance, was justified on the grounds that restricting civil liberties actually preserves them. 
In President Bush’s words, “the Patriot Act hasn’t diminished American liberties … It has helped 
to defend American liberties” (as cited in Fletcher, 2005, p. A6). Critics have observed similar 
phenomenon at work in discourses concerning anti-immigration (Pineda and Sowards, 2007), the 
Iraq war (Stuckey and Ritter, 2007; Kellner, 2007) and criminal justice (McCann, 2007). These 
critics demonstrate how political languages are the contested terrain of domination and 
liberation. 
 Similar to termination, the vocabulary of anti-affirmative action and anti-gay rights 
advocates assert that legislation to protect historically excluded groups proliferate special rights. 
Neoconservatives mirror termination’s logics: that conferral of federal protections specific to one 
group victimizes those without the protection and infringe on the rights of those who 
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discriminate. They appeal to constrictive, denotative forms of equality that measure social justice 
in vacuum, without reference to the disparate impact of historic discrimination. Omi and Winant 
(1994) observe that rhetorics of reverse discrimination advance anemic connotations of formal 
equality that are both ahistorical and discriminatory.  
 Orwellian language is not unique to the Bush administration and will not wither in the 
future. Orwell (1946) warns that we must be vigilant to resist terminological tyranny, because 
“political language - and with variations this is true of all political parties, from Conservatives to 
Anarchists - is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an 
appearance of solidity to pure wind” (p. 265). Of course, Orwell and Marcuse have been 
criticized by some for their pessimistic overdetermination of domination (Tomlinson, 2002; 
Habermas, 1970). Though critical of liberation, Marcuse attuned his theories to analyze the then-
existing modes of domination and liberation with an eye toward which parts of society could be 
negated or transformed. Marcuse (1972) leaves space for resistance when he argues that 
“instinctual rebellion will have become a political force only when it is accompanied and guided 
by the rebellion of reason” (p. 131). Informed but not overdetermined by structure, he suggests 
that because reason is an instrument of domination, society can be transformed through 
communicative practices that challenge conditioned thought and behavior (Best and Kellner 
1991, p. 291). Marcuse’s turn to reason emphasized the liberatory potential of those creative, and 
rhetorical, traits that stand in opposition to the objectification of thought (Kellner 1984, p. 235; 
Marcuse, 1955). Marcuse and Orwell guide critics to defend the vocabulary of liberation against 
the tyrannical influence of economic exploitation. 
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